Thomas Lloyd's Notes of the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention (December 1, 1787)

James Wilson: The secret is now disclosed, and it is discovered to be a dread, that the boasted state sovereignties will under this system be disrobed of part of their power. Before I go into the examination of this point, let me ask one important question. Upon what principle is it contended that the sovereign power resides in the state governments? The honorable gentleman has said truly, that there can be no subordinate sovereignty. Now if there cannot, my position is that the sovereignty resides in the people; they have not parted with it; they have only dispensed such portions of power as were conceived necessary for the public welfare. This Constitution stands upon this broad principle. I know very well, sir, that the people have hitherto been shut out of the federal government, but it is not meant that they should any longer be disposed of their rights. In order to recognize this leading principle, the proposed system sets out with a declaration, that its existence depends upon the supreme authority of the people alone. We have heard much about a consolidated government. I wish the honorable gentlemen would condescend to give us a definition of what he meant by it. I think this the more necessary, because I apprehend that the term, in the numerous times it has been used, has not always been used in the same sense. It may be said, and I believe it has been said, that a consolidated government is such, will absorb and destroy the governments of the several states.1 If it is taken in this view, the plan before us is not a consolidated government, as I showed on a former day, and may, if necessary, show further on some future occasion. On the other hand, if it is meant, that the general government will take from the state governments their power in some particulars, it is confessed and evident, that this will be its operation and effect.

When the principle is once settled, that the people are the source of authority, the consequence is, that they may take from the sub-ordinate governments powers with which they have hitherto trusted them, and place those powers in the general government, if it is thought that there they will be productive of more good. They can distribute one portion of power to the more contracted circle called state governments; they can also furnish another proportion to the government of the United States. Who will undertake to say, as a state officer, that the people may not give to the general government what powers, and for what purposes they please? How comes it, sir, that these state governments dictate to their superiors, to the majesty of the people? When I say the majesty of the people, I mean the thing and not a mere compliment to them. The honorable gentleman went a step further and said, that the state governments were kept out of this government altogether. The truth is, and it is a leading principle in this system, that not the states only, but the people also shall be here represented. And if this is a crime, I confess the general government is chargeable with it; but I have no idea, that a safe system of power, in the government, sufficient to manage the general interest of the United States, could be drawn from any other source or rested in any other authority than that of the people at large, and I consider this authority as the rock on which this structure will stand. If this principle is unfounded, the system must fall. If honorable gentlemen, before they undertake to oppose this principle, will show that the people have parted with their power to the state governments, then I confess I cannot support this Constitution.2 It is asked, can there be two taxing powers? Will the people submit to two taxing powers? I think they will, when the taxes are required for the public welfare, by persons appointed immediately by their fellow citizens.3

But I believe this doctrine is a very disagreeable one to some of the state governments. All the objects that will furnish an increase of revenue are eagerly seized by them; perhaps this4 will lead to the reason why a state government, when she was obliged to pay only about an eighth part of the loan-office certificates, should voluntarily undertake the payment of about one-third part of them. This power of taxation will be regulated in the general government upon equitable principles. No state can have more than her just proportion to discharge-no longer will government be obliged to assign her funds for the payment of debts she does not owe.5 Another objection has been taken, that the judicial powers are coextensive with the objects of the national government. So far as I can understand the idea of magistracy in every government, this seems to be a proper arrangement; the judicial department is considered as a part of the executive authority of government. Now, I have no idea that the authority should be restrained, so as not to be able to perform its functions with full effect. I would not have the legislature sit to make laws, which cannot be executed. It is not meant here that the laws shall be a dead letter; it is meant, that they shall be carefully and duly considered, before they are enacted; and that then they shall be honestly and faithfully executed. This observation naturally leads to a more particular consideration of the government before us. In order, sir, to give permanency, stability, and security to any government, I conceive it of essential importance, that its legislature should be restrained; that there should not only be what we call a passive, but an active power over it; for of all kinds of despotism, this is the most dreadful and the most difficult to be corrected. With how much contempt have we seen the authority of the people treated by the legislature of this state-and how often have we seen it making laws in one session, that have been repealed the next, either on account of the fluctuation of party or their own impropriety.

This could not have been the case in a compound legislature; it is therefore proper to have efficient restraints upon the legislative body. These restraints arise from different sources.6 I will mention some of them. In this Constitution they will be produced, in a very considerable degree, by a division of the power in the legislative body itself. Under this system, they may arise likewise fr7om the interference of those officers, who will be introduced into the executive and judicial departments. They may spring also from another source, the election by the people; and finally, under this Constitution, they may proceed from the great and last resort-from the PEOPLE them-selves. I say, under this Constitution, the legislature may be restrained, and kept within its prescribed bounds, by the interposition of the judicial department. This I hope, sir, to explain clearly and satisfactorily. I had occasion, on a former day, to state that the power of the Constitution was paramount to the power of the legislature, acting under that Constitution. For it is poss8ible that the legislature, when acting in that capacity, may transgress the bounds assigned to it, and an act may pass, in the usual mode, not-withstanding that transgression; but when it comes to be discussed before the judges-when they consider its principles and find it to be incompatible with the superior power of the Constitution, it is their du9ty to pronounce it void. ,And judges, independent and not obliged to look to every session for a continuance of their salaries, will behave with intrepidity and refuse to the act the sanction of judicial authority.I1011n the same manner, the 12President of the United States could shield himself and refuse to carry into effect an act that violates the Constitution.

In order to secure the President from any dependence upon the legislature as to his salary, it is provided, that he shall, at stated times, receive for his services, a compensation that shall neither be increased nor diminished, during the period for which he shall have been elected, and that he shall not receive, within that period, any other emolument from the United States, or any of them.13

To secure to the judges this independence, it is ordered that they shall receive for their services, a compensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.14 The Congress maybe restrained, by the election of its constituent parts. If a legislature shall make a law contrary to the Constitution, or oppressive to the people, they have it in their power, every second year, in one branch, and every sixth year in the other, to displace the men, who act thus inconsistent with their duty; and if this is not sufficient, they have still a further power; they may assume into their own hands, the alteration of the Constitution itself-they may revoke the lease when the conditions are broken by the tenant. But the most useful restraint upon the legislature, because it operates constantly, arises from the division of its power, among two branches and from the qualified negative of the President upon both. As this government is formed, there are two sources from which the representation is drawn, though they both ultimately flow from the people.1516 States now exist and others will come into existence; it was thought proper that they should be represented in the general government. But, gentlemen will please to remember, this Constitution was not framed merely for the states; it was framed for the PEOPLE also; and the popular branch of the Congress will be the objects of their immediate choice.1718

The two branches will serve as checks upon each other; they have the same legislative authorities, except in one instance. Money bills must originate in the House of Representatives.19 The Senate can pass no law without the concurrence of the House of Representatives; nor can the House of Representatives without the concurrence of the Senate. I believe, sir, that the observation which I am now going to make will apply to mankind in every situation; they will act with more caution, and perhaps more integrity, if their proceedings are to be under the inspection and control of another, than when they are not. From this principle, the proceedings of Congress will be conducted with a degree circumspection not common in single bodies, where nothing more is necessary to be done, than to carry the business through amongst themselves, whether it be right or wrong. In compound legislatures, every object must be submitted to a distinct body, not influenced by the arguments or warped by the prejudices of the other. And, I believe, that the persons who will form the Congress will be cautious in running the risk, with a bare majority, of having the negative of the President put on their proceedings. As there will be more circumspection in forming the laws, so there will be more stability in the laws when made. Indeed one is the consequence of the other; for what has been well considered, and founded in good sense, will, in practice, be useful and salutary, and of con- sequence will not be liable to be soon repealed. Though two bodies may not possess more wisdom or patriotism than what may be found in a single body, yet they will necessarily introduce a greater degree of precision. An indigested and inaccurate code of laws is one of the most dangerous things that can be introduced into any government. The force of this observation is well-known by every gentleman that has attended to the laws of this state. This, sir, is a very important advantage, that will arise from this division of the legislative authority.20

I will proceed now to take some notice ofa still further restraint upon the legislature-I mean the qualified negative of the President. I think this will be attended with very important advantages, for the security and happiness of the people of the United States.21 The President, sir, will not be a stranger to our country, to our laws, or to our wishes. He will, under this Constitution, be placed in office as the President of the whole Union, and will be chosen in such a manner that he may be justly styled THE MAN OF THE PEOPLE; being elected by the different parts of the United States, he will consider himself as not particularly interested for anyone of them, but will watch over the whole with paternal care and affection. This will be the natural conduct to recommend himself to those who placed him in that high chair, and I consider it as a very important advantage, that such a man must have every law presented to him, before it can become binding upon the United States. He will have before him the fullest information of our situation; he will avail himself not onlyof records and official communications, foreign and domestic, but he will have also the advice of the executive o22fficers in the different departments of the general government.

If in consequence of this information and advice, he exercise[s] the authority given to him, the effect will not be lost-he returns his objection, together with the bill, and unless two-thirds of both branches of the legislature are now found to approve it, it does not become a law. But even if his objections do not prevent its passing into a law, the will not be useless; they will be kept together with the law, and, in the archives of Congress, will be valuable and practical materials. to form the minds of prosperity for legislation-if it is found that the law operates inconveniently, or oppressively, the people may discover in the President's objections, the source of that inconvenience or oppression. Further, sir, when objections shall have been made, it is provided, in order to secure the greatest degree of caution and responsibility, that the votes of both houses shall be determined by yeas and nays, and the names of the persons, voting for and against the bill, shall be entered in the journal of each house respectively. Thus much I have thought proper to say, with regard to the distribution of the legislative authority, and the restraints under which it will be exercised.23

JAMES WILSON: The gentleman in opposition strongly insists, that the general clause at the end of the eighth section, gives to Congress a power of legislating generally; but I cannot conceive by what means he will render the words susceptible of that expansion. Can the words, the Congress shall have power to make all laws, which shall be necessary and proper to carry into execution the foregoing powers, be capable of giving them general legislative power? I hope that it is not meant to give to Congress merely an illusive show of authority, to deceive themselves or constituents any longer. On the contrary, I trust it is meant that they shall have the power of carrying into effect the laws, which they shall make under the powers vested in them by this Constitution.24 In answer to the gentleman from Fayette on the subject of the press, I beg leave to make an observation; it is very true, sir, that this Constitution says nothing with regard to that subject, nor was it necessary, because it will be found that there is given to the general government no power whatsoever concerning it; and no law in pursuance of the Constitution can possibly be enacted to destroy that liberty.25

I heard the honorable gentleman make this general assertion, that the Congress was certainly vested with power to make such a law, but I would be glad to know by what part of this Constitution such a power is given? Until that is done, I shall not enter into a minute investigation of the matter, but shall at present satisfy myself with giving an answer to a question that has been put. It has been asked, if a law should be made to punish libels, and the judges should proceed under that law, what chance would the printer have of an acquittal? And it has been said he would drop into a den of devouring monsters.

I presume it was not in the view of the honorable gentleman to say there is no such thing as a libel or that the writers of such ought not to be punished. The idea of the liberty of the press is not carried so far as this in any country— what is meant by the liberty of the press is, that there should be no antecedent restraint upon it; but that every author is responsible when he attacks the security or welfare of the government or the safety, character, and property of the individual.

With regard to attacks upon the public, the mode of proceeding is by a prosecution. Now if a libel is written, it must be within some one of the United States or the district of Congress. With regard to that district, I hope it will take care to preserve this as well as the other rights of freemen; for whatever district Congress may choose, the cession of it cannot be completed without the consent of its inhabitants. Now, sir, if this libel is to be tried, it must be tried where the offense was committed; for under this Constitution, as declared in the second section of the third Article, the trial must be held in the state; therefore on this occasion it must be tried where it was published, if the indictment is for publishing; and it must be tried likewise by a jury of that state.26 Now I would ask, is the person prosecuted in a worse situation under the general government, even if it had the power to make laws on this subject, than he is at present under the state government? It is true, there is no particular regulation made, to have the jury come from the body of the county in which the offense was committed; but there are some states in which this mode of collecting juries is contrary to their established custom, and gentlemen ought to consider that this Constitution was not meant merely for Pennsylvania. In some states the juries are not taken from a single county. In Virginia, the sheriff, I believe, is not confined even to the inhabitants of the state, but is at liberty to take any man he pleases and put him on the jury. In Maryland I think a set of jourors serve for the whole Western Shore, and another for the Eastern Shore.27

I beg to make one remark on what one gentleman has said, with respect to amendments being proposed to this Constitution. To whom are the Convention to make report of such amendments? He tells you, to the present Congress. I do not wish to report to that body, the representatives only of the state governments; they may not be disposed to admit the people into a participation of their power.28 It has also been supposed, that a wonderful unanimity subsists among those who are enemies to the proposed system. On this point I also differ from the gentleman who made the observation. I have taken every pains in my power, and read every publication I would meet with, in order to gain information; and as far as I have been able to judge, the opposition is inconsiderable and inconsistent. Instead of agreeing in their objections, those who make them bring forward such as are diametrically opposite. On one hand, it is said, that the representation in Congress is too small; on the other, it is said to be too numerous. Some think the authority of the Senate too great; some that of the House of Representatives; and some that of both. Others draw their fears from the powers of the President; and like the iron race of Cadmus, these opponents rise, only to destroy each other.29