Log In Register

James Madison's Notes of the Constitutional Convention (July 2, 1787)

Monday July 2d. in Convention
On the question for allowing each State one vote in the second branch as moved by Mr. Elseworth. Massts. no. Cont. ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Mr. Jenifer being not present Mr. Martin alone voted Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. divd. Mr. Houston no. Mr. Baldwin ay [Ayes — 5; noes — 5; divided — 1.]
1
Mr. Pinkney thought an equality of votes in the 2d. branch inadmissable. At the same time candor obliged him to admit that the large States would feel a partiality for their own Citizens & give them a preference, in appointments: that they might also find some common points in their Commercial interests, and promote treaties favorable to them. There is a real distinction [between] the Northern & Southn. interests. N. Carola. S. Carol: & Geo. in their Rice & Indigo had a peculiar interest which might be sacrificed. How then shall the larger States be prevented from administering the Genl. Govt. as they please, without being themselves unduly subjected to the will of the smaller? By allowing them some but not a full, proportion. He was extremely anxious that something should be done, considering this as the last appeal to a regular experiment. Congs. have failed in almost every effort for an amendment of the federal System. Nothing has prevented a dissolution of it, but the appointmt. of this Convention; & he could not express his alarms for the consequences of such an event. He read his motion, to form the States into classes, with an apportionment of Senators among them (see Art: 4, of his plan.)
General Pinkney. was willing the motion might be considered. He did not entirely approve it. He liked better the motion of Docr. Franklin (which see Saturday June 30). Some Compromise seemed to be necessary, the States being exactly divided on the question for an equality of votes in the 2d. branch. He proposed that a Committee consisting of a member from each State should be appointed to devise & report some compromise.
2
Mr. L. Martin had no objection to a commitment, but no modifications whatever could reconcile the Smaller States to the least diminution of their equal Sovereignty.
Mr. Sharman. We are now at a full stop, and nobody he supposed meant that we shd. break up without doing something. A committee he thought most likely to hit on some expedient.
*Mr. Govr. Morris. thought a Come. adviseable as the Convention had been equally divided. He had a stronger reason also. The mode of appointing the 2d. branch tended he was sure to defeat the object of it. What is this object? To check the precipitation, changeableness, and excesses of the first branch. Every man of observation had seen in the democratic branches of the State Legislatures, precipitation — in Congress changeableness, in every department excesses agst. personal liberty private property & personal safety. What qualities are necessary to constitute a check in this case? Abilities and virtue, are equally necessary in both branches. Something more then is now wanted. 1. the checking branch must have a personal interest in checking the other branch, one interest must be opposed to another interest. Vices as they exist, must be turned agst. each other. 2. It must have great personal property, it must have the aristocratic spirit; it must love to lord it thro' pride. Pride is indeed the great principle that actuates both the poor & the rich. It is this principle which in the former resists, in the latter abuses authority. 3. It should be independent. In Religion the Creature is apt to forget its Creator. That it is otherwise in Political Affairs, the late debates here are an unhappy proof. The aristocratic body, should be as independent & as firm as the democratic. If the members of it are to revert to a dependence on the democratic choice, the democratic scale will preponderate. All the guards contrived by America have not restrained the Senatorial branches of the Legislatures from a servile complaisance to the democratic. If the 2d. branch is to be dependent we are better without it. To make it independent, it should be for life.3 It will then do wrong, it will be said. He believed so; He hoped so. The Rich will strive to establish their dominion & enslave the rest. They always did. They always will. The proper security agst them is to form them into a separate interest. The two forces will then controul each other. Let the rich mix with the poor and in a Commercial Country, they will establish an Oligarchy. Take away commerce, and the democracy will triumph. Thus it has been all the world over. So it will be among us. Reason tells us we are but men: and we are not to expect any particular interference of Heaven in our favor. By thus combining & setting apart, the aristocratic interest, the popular interest will be combined agst. it. There will be a mutual check and mutual security. 4. An independence for life, involves the necessary permanency. If we change our measures nobody will trust us: and how avoid a change of measures, but by avoiding a change of men. Ask any man if he confides in Congs. if he confides in the State of Pena. if he will lend his money or enter into contract? He will tell you no. He sees no stability. He can repose no confidence. If G. B. were to explain her refusal to treat with us, the same reasoning would be employed. — He disliked the exclusion of the 2d. branch from holding offices. It is dangerous. It is like the imprudent exclusion of the military officers during the war, from civil appointments. It deprives the Executive of the principal source of influence. If danger be apprehended from the Executive what a left-handed way is this of obviating it? If the son, the brother or the friend can be appointed, the danger may be even increased, as the disqualified father &c. can then boast of a disinterestedness which he does not possess. Besides shall the best, the most able, the most virtuous citizens not be permitted to hold offices? Who then are to hold them? He was also agst. paying the Senators. They will pay themselves if they can. If they can not they will be rich and can do without it. Of such the 2d. branch ought to consist; and none but such can compose it if they are not to be paid — He contended that the Executive should appoint the Senate & fill up vacancies. This gets rid of the difficulty in the present question. You may begin with any ratio you please; it will come to the same thing. The members being independt. & for life, may be taken as well from one place as from another. — It should be considered too how the scheme could be carried through the States. He hoped there was strength of mind eno' in this House to look truth in the face. He did not hesitate therefore to say that loaves & fishes must bribe the Demagogues. They must be made to expect higher offices under the general than the State Govts. A Senate for life will be a noble bait. Without such captivating prospects, the popular leaders will oppose & defeat the plan. He perceived that the 1st. branch was to be chosen by the people of the States; the 2d. by those chosen by the people. Is not here a Govt. by the States, a Governt. by Compact between Virga. in the 1st. & 2d. branch, Massts. in the 1st & 2d. branch &c. This is going back to mere treaty. It is no Govt. at all. It is altogether dependent on the States, and will act over again the part which Congs has acted. A firm Governt. alone can protect our liberties. He fears the influence of the rich. They will have the same effect here as elsewhere if we do not by such a Govt. keep them within their proper sphere. We should remember that the people never act from reason alone. The Rich will take advantage of their passions & make these the instruments for oppressing them. The Result of the Contest will be a violent aristocracy, or a more violent despotism. The schemes of the Rich will be favored by the extent of the Country. The people in such distant parts cannot communicate & act in concert. They will be the dupes of those who have more knowledge & intercourse. The only security agst. encroachments will be a select & sagacious body of men, instituted to watch agst. them on all sides. He meant only to hint these observations, without grounding any motion on them.
Mr. Randolph favored the commitment though he did not expect much benefit from the expedient. He animadverted on the warm & rash language of Mr. Bedford on Saturday; reminded the small States that if the large States should combine some danger of which he did not deny there would be a check in the revisionary power of the Executive, and intimated that in order to render this still more effectual, he would agree that in the choice of the Executive each State should have an equal vote.4 He was persuaded that two such opposite bodies as Mr. Morris had planned, could never long co-exist. Dissentions would arise, as has been seen even between the Senate and H. of Delegates in Maryland, appeals would be made to the people; and in a little time commotions would be the result — He was far from thinking the large States could subsist of themselves any more than the small; an avulsion would involve the whole in ruin, and he was determined to pursue such a scheme of Government as would secure us agst. such a calamity.
Mr. Strong was for the comitment; and hoped the mode of constituting both branches would be referred. If they should be established on different principles, contentions would prevail, and there would never be a concurrence in necessary measures.
Docr. Williamson. If we do not concede on both sides, our business must soon be at an end. He approved of the comitment, supposing that as the Come. wd. be a smaller body, a compromise would be pursued with more coolness.
Mr. Wilson objected to the Committee, because it would decide according to that very rule of voting which was opposed on one side. Experience in Congs. had also proved the inutility of Committees consisting of members from each State.
Mr. Lansing wd. not oppose the commitment, though expecting little advantage from it.
Mr. Madison opposed the Comitment. He had rarely seen any other effect than delay from such Committees in Congs. Any scheme of compromise that could be proposed in the Committee might as easily be proposed in the House; and the report of the Committee where it contained merely the opinion of the Come would neither shorten the discussion, nor influence the decision of the House.
Mr. Gerry was for the commitmt. Something must be done, or we shall disappoint not only America, but the whole world. He suggested a consideration of the State we should be thrown into by the failure of the Union. We should be without an Umpire to decide controversies and must be at the mercy of events. What too is to become of our treaties — what of our foreign debts, what of our domestic? We must make concessions on both sides. Without these the Constitutions of the several States would never have been formed.
On the question "for comiting," generally:
Massts. ay. Cont. ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. P. ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [Ayes — 9; noes — 2.]
On the question for comiting it "to a member from each State"
Massts. ay. Cont. ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo — ay. [Ayes — 10; noes — 1.]
The Comittee elected by ballot, were Mr. Gerry, Mr. Elseworth, Mr. Yates, Mr. Patterson. Dr. Franklin, Mr. Bedford, Mr. Martin, Mr. Mason, Mr. Davy. Mr. Rutlidge, Mr. Baldwin.
That time might be given to the Comittee, and to such as chose to attend to the celebrations on the anniversary of Independence, the Convention adjourned till Thursday.
[*] He had just returned from N. Y. havg. left ye. Convention a few days after it commenced business.

Resource Metadata

Type

Date

1787-7-2

Authors

Collections

Source & Citation Info

title:“James Madison's Notes of the Constitutional Convention”
authors:James Madison
date written:1787-7-2

permanent link
to this version:
http://consource.org/document/james-madisons-notes-of-the-constitutional-convention-1787-7-2/20130122084737/
last updated:Jan. 22, 2013, 8:47 a.m. UTC
retrieved:Dec. 20, 2014, 2:23 p.m. UTC

transcription
citation:
Madison, James. "James Madison's Notes of the Constitutional Convention." The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787. Vol. 1. Ed. Max Farrand. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1911. 510-16. Print.
manuscript
source:
Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress